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Abstract 
I test the determinants of workers ’  remittances, with a focus on how economic 
freedom in the labor sending country affects the level of remittance inflows the 
country receives. I use an unbalanced panel data set between years 2000 and 
2006. I find a positive and statistically significant relationship between economic 
freedom and the percentage of GDP from remittances. I show that the effect of 
economic freedom is dependent upon the level  of economic development in the 
labor sending country (measured by  real GDP per capita); as GDP per capita 
increases, the marginal effect of economic freedom on r emittances decreases 
steadily. 
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INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Since living in the Philippines, a nation that received $21.3 billion, 10.7 % of its GDP, in 
remittance inflows in 2010, I have been intrigued and interested in workers’ remittances 
(World Bank 2011).  I witnessed households who were able to use remittances as an 
important tool to climb out of poverty by investing remittances in human and capital 
stocks.  I witnessed households that were solely dependent upon remittances, without 
these inflows they would have been completely destitute.  I found myself questioning what 
macroeconomic factors lead to more, or less, remittance inflows for a country; particularly 
does the size of the government, existence of property rights, access to capital, the ability to 
trade and the amount of regulation a country imposes affect the amount of remittances 
inflows received. In other words does the level of economic freedom a country has affect its 
amount of remittance inflows? 
Remittances, transfers of money by foreign workers to his or her home country, are 
increasing in size and importance each year and constitute a significant inflow of money to 
countries, particularly developing countries, throughout the world.  In 2009 worldwide 
remittance inflows reached $416 billion, an increase from $101 billion in 1995 (World 
Bank 2011).  For many developing countries remittances exceed international aid. For 
example, remittances in Tajikistan were $1 billion in 2006; international aid was $240 
million in that same year (World Bank 2011).  In 2006 worldwide aid from donor nations 
reached $104 billion and foreign direct investment reached $167 billion. Worldwide 
remittances in 2006 was $318 billion, more than aid from donor nations and foreign direct 
investment combined (World Bank 2011).  As remittances continue to increase in 
importance and size the key macroeconomic determinants that affect remittances become 
increasingly important for administrations to consider.  In particular the amount of 
economic freedom within a country, which is affected greatly by administration policy 
choices, needs to be considered.  
Remittance theoretical literature is heavily based upon Lucas and Stark (1985). Lucas 
and Stark propose three primary theoretical models regarding the motivations of remitting 
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behavior by individuals.   The first theoretical model assumes that individuals remit money 
for altruistic reasons.  Under this model the remitting individual derives utility from the 
consumption and associated well being of the recipient(s). As Lucas and Stark write, 
“Certainly the most obvious motive for remitting is pure altruism—the care of a migrant for 
those left behind. Indeed, this appears to be the single notion underlying much of the 
remittance Literature” (Lucas and Stark 1985, 902). Under a model of pure altruism 
remittances should be positively correlated with the remitter’s own income (Niimi, Pham 
and Reilly 2008). This is clear in the case of developing countries where a unit of 
remittances can increase consumption and well-being relatively more than in developed 
countries due to a larger purchasing power.  Economic difficulty or natural disasters in the 
home country can be an important motivator for workers to send remittances (Lucas and 
Stark 1985).  Remittances sent home to ease the economic shock from such disasters are 
thought to be altruistic.  In their micro study El-Sakka and McNabb showed that 
remittances to Egypt increased with lower levels of income and higher levels of inflation 
within the labor sending country (El-Sakka and Mcnabb 1999). Equally migrants with 
families in Botswana that experienced natural disasters sent more remittances home than 
those outside the regions where natural disasters occurred (Lucas and Stark 1985). 
Remittances can also be modeled as pure self-interest—an investment.  Under this 
model the remitter will remit money to invest in the labor sending country with the 
intention to see a financial return.  Lucas and Stark (1985) define three different structures 
of self interested motivations.  The first is to invest in assets within the sending country. 
The second is investment by the migrant to prepare for a return to the labor sending 
country.  Remittances would be sent to acquire assets such as land.  Lucas and Stark (1988) 
define the third type of self interested remittance motivation as a willingness to inherit, 
with a positive relationship between the amount of assets in the family of origin within the 
sending country (potential inheritance) and the level of remittances.  
The third theoretical motivation to remit theorizes that the family functions as a form of 
financial intermediary or bank. The family gives loans for the benefit of the family. Lucas 
and Stark (1985), Stark and Lucas (1988), and Agrawal and Horowitz (2002) suggest that 
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the family functions as a lending institution to the immigrant to invest in their human 
capital, travel costs or other expenses associated with the act of migration. Once migration 
occurs the emigrant then remits money to repay the loan.  The family can then take the 
money and reinvest it in other members of the household.  
In the latter two models, self interest and family as a financial intermediary, altruism 
continues to play an important role as an enforcing mechanism.  It ensures the migrant, and 
the family members, will up hold their end of the contract – whether it is to repay a loan for 
education to the household or to manage assets or capital of the remitter (Stark and Lucas 
1988).  In these models more macro-economic factors, like interest rates, labor force 
participation and real exchange rates have impacts on the level of international remittances 
that a county receives (El-Sakka and Mcnabb 1999).    
Empirical research has focused on determinants such as skill level (education), labor 
force participation rate, domestic inflation rate, domestic interest rate and exchange rates. 
Studies focused on the macro-economic determinants of remittances focus on a single 
country (El-Sakka and Mcnabb 1999)1 (Argawal and Horowitz 2002)2or on a small cross 
sectional sample of countries (Faini 1994)3.  Faiani (1994) and El-Sakka and McNabb 
(1999) each found exchange rate differences and domestic interest rate differences to be a 
significant determinant of remittance inflows. El-Sakka and McNabb (1999) and Faiani 
(1994) based their research on a single country (Egypt) and on five Mediterranean 
countries respectively. These papers concluded that both interest and exchange rates 
                                                                    
1 El-Sakka and Mcnabb (1999) used annual data from 1967-91 for cash remittances to Egypt and annual data 
from 1974-91 for imports finances from remittance sources, the authors tested the determinants of 
remittances to Egypt finding a statistically significant positive relationship with inflation, and a statistically 
significant negative relationship with the difference of domestic and foreign interest rates (domestic minus 
foreign) and the difference of official exchange rates and black market exchange rates (domestic minus black 
market).  
2 Argawal and Horowitz (2002) used a cross sectional data set using a household survey collected by the 
Guyana Bureau of Statistics between 1992 and 1993.  In addition to testing the determinants of remittances 
they also ran a probit model on the decision to remit.  They found statistically significant determinants of 
remittances to be the presence of other migrants in the household (negative), household size (negative), 
household per-capita income (negative) and the age of the household head (negative) 
3 Faini (1994) used a cross-sectional data set comprised of Mediterranean countries (Morocco, Portugal, 
Tunisia, Turkey and Yugoslavia) between 1977 and 1989. Faini, using Seemingly unrelated regression 
framework tested the determinants of remittances, finding statistically significant positive relationships with 
the interest rate differential (host country interest rate minus home country interest rate minus expected 
devaluation), the real exchange rate and a statistically significant negative relationship with the home 
country’s income.  
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differences need to be competitive to support remittance inflows to the labor-sending 
countries. Inflation is an additional macroeconomic factor that may act as a key 
determinant to remittance inflows to labor sending countries. El-Sakka and McNabb (1999) 
find that domestic inflation is associated with higher levels of remittances. They propose 
that this may be to allow migrants’ families to maintain consumption levels, thus 
demonstrating altruism.  It also could be theoretically argued that if a negative relationship 
between domestic inflation and remittances may provide evidence that remittances are 
investments and not altruistic.  Adams (2008) used a more complete cross sectional data 
set of 76 low and middle income countries. Adams (2008)4 found that “all of the 
coefficients measuring real interest rates at home are positively and significantly related to 
the level of per capita remittances received by a country. In this study, countries with more 
competitive real interest rates receive more per capita remittances” (R. H. Adams 2008, 
100). A higher level of domestic interest rate (in the labor sending country) is also 
associated with high level of remittance inflows, representing that migrants are motivated 
by investment returns at home (El-Sakka and Mcnabb 1999).  
The level of skilled labor being exported by sending countries is widely considered a 
key determinant of remittance inflows. Surprisingly Adams (2008) found a negative 
correlation between the proportion of skilled labor exported by countries and the level of 
the country’s remittance inflows. He proposes that this result could represent that higher 
skilled workers are less likely to return to their country of origin and are more likely to 
bring family members with them, making them less concerned with their home country.  
Adams (2008) found that “the level of poverty in the labor-sending country does not 
have a positive impact on the amount of remittances received by a country” (R. H. Adams 
                                                                    
4 Adams (2008) used a cross country data set comprised of 76 low and middle income countries using data 
from 1995 to 2001. Adams (2008) collected and merged the data between the 6 years to create a more 
complete cross country data set due to the unavailability of data. The statistically significant determinants of 
remittances on the low-skilled population were: the percent of low-skilled migrants from labor sending 
country (positive), percent of population under 14 in labor sending country (positive), per capita GDP in 
labor sending country (positive), real interest rate in labor sending country (positive). Other control variables 
for the determinants of remittances on the low skilled population where: stock of total migrants from the 
labor sending country, poverty headcount in labor sending country, poverty gap in labor-sending country, 
cost to remit $200 to labor sending country, exchange rate in labor sending country, war in labor sending 
country. Using the same instruments Adams (2008) tested the determinants on a high skilled migrant 
populations, the statistically significant determinants were Poverty headcount (negative), percent of 
population under 14 years, per capital GDP (positive), real interest rate (positive).  
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2008, 99). El-Sakka and McNabb (1999) find that “the level of real domestic income, in 
contrast, does appear to influence the flow of remittance earnings“ (El-Sakka and Mcnabb 
1999, 1497). Income is classically measured using GDP from the labor sending country 
(Faini 1994) (Lucas and Stark 1985). Adams (2008) chooses to “clarify the impact of 
income on the determination of remittances” by using GDP per capita income from the 
labor sending country and finds GDP per capita and the level of remittances, regardless of 
the skill level of migrants, to be positively correlated – a finding that conflicts with the 
theory of altruism.  
Using GDP growth as the dependent variable Chami, Fullenkamp and Jahjah (2005) test 
if remittances function in the same manner as FDI. They suggest that remittances cause 
shirking of work, which would be represented by lower levels of labor force participation.  
Chami, Fullenkamp and Jahjah (2005)5 found a negative relationship between remittance 
inflows and GDP growth, where as they found a positive relationship between labor force 
participation rate and other capital flows such as FDI. Chami, Fullenkamp and Jahjah 
(2005) argue “remittances do not appear to be intended to serve as capital for economic 
development, but as compensation for poor economic performance” (Chami, Fullenkamp 
and Jahjah 2005, 77).  
Global locality has been addressed in a number of empirical studies with the use of 
regional dummy variables. Some regions are more reliant upon remittances than others, in 
particular Latin America, Asia and Africa. For example, remittances have increased twenty 
fold since 1980 to Latin America, and the region receives more foreign remittances than 
any other region of the world, US$40 billion in 2004 (Acosta, et al. 2006).   
Economic theory says economic freedom “affects incentives, productive effort, and the 
effectiveness of resource use” (Strum and Haan 2001, 839). When this is applied to the self-
interest theory for remitting money we expect to see a positive relationship between 
remittances and economic freedom in the labor sending country. The relationship between 
workers’ remittances and economic freedom has not been empirically tested within the 
literature. Empirically the literature has examined the relationship between economic 
                                                                    
5 Chami, Fullenkamp and Jahjah (2005) do not test the determinants of remittances, but instead if remittances 
function the same as other sources of capital, therefore their dependent variable is GDP growth rate.  
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freedom and other factors such as economic growth (Strum and Haan 2001), economic 
development (Assane and Grammy 2003), and corruption (Billger and Goel 2009).  The 
meaning of economic freedom can be vague. Gwartney and Lawerson (2003) quantify the 
characteristics in each country that measure the different components of economic 
freedom – and then aggregate them into an index.  There is an overall economic freedom 
index (EFI) and an individual index for each of the five areas of economic freedom that 
Gwartnery and Lawerson (2003) measure. The key components of economic freedom are 
voluntary exchange, personal choice, freedom to compete, and the protection of property 
and persons (Gwartney and Lawson 2003).  The empirical literature supports that an 
increase in economic freedom leads to greater material prosperity in the adapting 
countries (Stoup 2007).  
DATA  
 
I use a panel data set across 82 countries from year 2000 to year 20066. Workers 
remittance inflows were collected from World Bank’ Migration and Remittances Factbook 
(2008).  The data originate from the International Monetary Fund’s Balance of Payments 
Statistics Yearbook.  Remittance inflows are measured by each labor sending country; these 
measures include only data on official international remittance inflows7. Therefore the 
actual level of remittances will be much higher than what is recorded by the IMF and the 
World Bank.  Workers’ remittances are standardized by each countries current GDP (for 
the appropriate year). The dependent variable modeled in the empirical section can then 
be interpreted as the percentage of GDP from remittance inflows.   
The independent variable of interest is economic freedom8. An index published by the 
Fraser institute annually within the Economic Freedom of the World: Annual Report. This 
index is comprised of 42 indicators that are used to generate a country level measure 
across five key areas; the size of government (expenditures, taxes and enterprise), legal 
structure and security of property rights, access to sound money, freedom to trade 
                                                                    
6 See appendix B for list of countries 
7 The data provided are in current value and does not include remittances transferred through unofficial, or 
black-market, channels.   
8 See appendix A for full summary statistics and appendix E for detailed data description.  
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internationally, and regulation of credit, labor and business.  It can be thought of as a 
quality measure of a country’s institutional and policy environment (Gwartney and Lawson 
2003). The index measures are available semi-regularly from 1980 through 2007; in 2000 
they became available on an annual basis. The highest ranking in 2007 was Hong Kong with 
a rating of 8.97 out of 10, in the same year the United States had a rating of 8.06. The global 
average across the six years focused on within this paper is 6.58. The Economic freedom 
index, in addition to providing an overall measure of economic freedom, provides 
individual measures across the five key areas previously mentioned, also on a scale of one 
to ten9.  
Real gross domestic product per capita within the labor sending country, a key 
macroeconomic control used throughout the literature, has had mixed empirical results.  In 
this paper I use real GDP per capita, measured in year 2000 values, collected from the Penn 
World Tables.  The average real GDP per capita from the sample used in this study is 
$12,687; with a large amount of variation within the sample – a standard deviation of 
$44,452.   Africa has the lowest average GDP per capita across the specific regions, at 
$2,864, yet it also has the lowest level of remittances at 0.7% of GDP.  This, in conjunction 
with the highest deposit rate across regions, 9.26%, does little to support altruistic or self-
interested remittance theories.  
Due to the unavailability of data I am not able to calculate the exchange rate difference 
with the black market; however this variable is included within the individual area 4 of the 
economic freedom index.  Also included in the economic freedom index is real inflation rate 
(economic freedom area 3) and real interest rate (economic freedom area 5). Studies 
focusing on a single country (El-Sakka and Mcnabb 1999) or a small region (Faini 1994) 
have found these variables to be key controls.   
The level of human capital available to the labor sending country has been a key 
determinant across the literature. In this study I use the percentage of secondary school 
age children enrolled in secondary school as a proxy for the countries’ focus and 
commitment to human capital development. The average across the data is 67% of school 
                                                                    
9 Area 1 – Size of government, Area 2 – Legal structure and security of property rights, Area 3 – Access to 
sound money, Area 4 – Freedom to exchange with foreigners, Area 5 – Regulation of credit, labor and 
business  
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aged children enrolled in secondary school; the minimum of is 4% and maximum is 99%.  
This measure is collected from the World Bank data bank.  
Families will be dependent upon remittances if they have a low labor force participation 
rate – regardless if this unemployment is, or is not, by choice. In some cases migrants may 
be sending money home, allowing family members to purchase a reduction of their labor 
supply, as proposed by Chami, Fullenkamp and Jahjah (2005). Migrants may also be 
sending money to family members that are willing, but unable, to find employment in the 
labor sending country. Labor force participation rate is collected by from the World Bank 
data bank.  
The level of communication between immigrants and their families within the labor 
sending country may have an impact on the level of remittances sent back to the country. 
Theoretically this would support both altruistic and self motivated motivations to remit.  A 
migrant able to regularly communicate with his family may be better able to gauge when 
and if they require financial assistance. Where as an individual focused on personal 
investment can stay more informed regarding investment possibilities. I have chosen to 
control for both the number of cell phone and internet users per one hundred people 
within the labor sending countries. Lastly I follow Adams (2008) and control for the stock 
of migrants abroad using country population, with data found from Penn World Tables. 
EMPIRICAL APPROACH 
 
I estimate remittances as a percentage of GDP (WRI,t) as a function of economic 
freedom, (EFi,t) and a vector of demographic (Xi,t) and communication variables (Ci,t) 10 
discussed in the data section.   
                              
For economic freedom (as well as its five area components) I hypothesize a positive 
relationship with the dependent variable.  These variables, and their effect, have not yet 
                                                                    
10 The estimation and analysis will be conducted using STATA 11.0.  
Banwa rt    11 | P a g e  
 
 
been tested within the literature, therefore hypothesizing the magnitude of the coefficients 
is not realistic. Theoretically it is reasonable to assume the positive results will be 
significant.  
The literature has shown a significant negative relationship between workers’ 
remittances and real GDP (or real GDP per capita) within micro studies, however macro 
studies have shown this relationship to be positive.  I further test the relationship of 
economic freedom and real GDP per capita (GDPi,t) on workers’ remittances by interacting 
the two variables. This effect of economic freedom on workers’ remittances conditional 
upon real GDP per capita (the country’s level of economic development).  
By using country and time fixed effects estimation I control for individual country and 
time related unobservable variables. There are several variables, including country specific 
public policy, institutional and historical factors that will affect the level of remittances a 
labor sending country receives. Therefore if OLS is used to estimate the above model the 
results would be biased. These factors can be accounted for with country fixed effects (see 
model below), where Di is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for country i and 
zero for all other countries (regardless of time) and α is a fixed-effect controlling for the 
unobservable differences between countries. Dt is a dummy variable that takes the value of 
one for time t and 0 for all other times (regardless of country) and   is a fixed-effect 
controlling for unobservable differences across times. I correct for autocorrelation of order 
1 (AR1)11 and heteroskedaciticy. I estimate the country and time fixed effects model using 
feasible GLS to correct for each. 
                                            +                ∑     
 
    ∑     
 
           
I then estimate the effect of each of the five individual area of economic freedom on 
workers’ remittances, where areaEFi represents the ith area of economic freedom (see 
below).  
                                                    +                ∑     
 
    ∑     
 
           
                                                                    
11 A test of Autocorrelation of order 1 resulted in a strong rejection of the null hypothesis of no 
autocorrelation of order 1  
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EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
ECONOMIC FREEDOM INDEX (EFI) 
 
Specification 1 (Table 1 – Column 1) shows workers’ remittances as a percentage of 
GDP regressed onto the overall level of economic freedom (EFI) while controlling for 
country and time fixed effects.  In this specification no demographic or communication 
variables are controlled for, however it is worth noting that many of the components that 
the EFI is built upon are macro-economic determinants of remittances within the 
remittance literature (inflation rate, real interest rate, official and black market exchange 
rate difference).  Within specification 1 there is a statistically significant positive effect of 
EFI on workers’ remittances as a percentage of GDP.   
Specification 2 (Table 1 – Column 1) shows a statistically significant positive effect of 
EFI on workers’ remittances as a percentage of GDP holds while controlling for key 
demographic variables.  The economic effect of EFI increases slightly, from .13% in 
specification 2, to .14%,.  The signs, and statistically significance, of the other demographic 
control variables align with the previous literature on the economic determinants of 
remittances.  Real GDP per capita has a statistically significant and negative relationship, 
suggesting a level of altruism within the sample. A reduction in income levels within the 
labor sending country will result in a migrant remitting money home to relatives and loved 
ones to smooth their consumption levels.  The effect of labor force participation rate is 
statistically significant and negative, suggesting similar altruistic motives as real GDP per 
capita. As a migrant’s family members are unable (or unwilling) to participate within the 
labor force the migrant will remit money home to smooth their income and consumption 
levels.  The percentage of school aged children enrolled in secondary education, controlling 
for the level of human capital available to a country, is positive but not statistically 
significant. This suggests that as a country places more emphasis on human capital there 
will be a positive effect on remittances as a percentage of GDP. In specification 3 and 4 the 
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statistically significance of the human capital measure increases.  Interestingly the 
relationship of population, a measure of the available stock of migrants, is the opposite of 
what was found in other studies (Adams 2008). This relationship, as well as its statistical 
significance, holds across all three specifications (as well as the later tests on the individual 
areas of economic freedom).  This may be the result of countries with smaller populations 
having economies that are more dependent upon workers’ remittances.  
The interaction between EFI and real GDP per capita allows the examination of the 
effect of EFI on workers’ remittances conditional on the level of economic development 
within each country12. When this interaction term is introduced in model (column 3), the 
signs and significance levels of the other control variables (with the exception of the 
significance of the human capital measure) remain the same.  The joint significance of EFI, 
real GDP per capita and their interaction is statistically significant at a 1% level13 allowing 
for further analysis of these variables.  
Specification 4 introduces a measure of communication, the number of internet users 
per 100 people.  This measure will theoretically be positive regardless of if the intentions to 
remit are self interest or altruistic.  If a person is altruistic they will be more likely to remit 
if they have a greater opportunity to remain in communication with family members or 
loved ones. Equally a person is more likely to remit for self interest (investment) reasons if 
they are more likely to oversee those investments via regular lines of communication.  This 
introduction of this variable, as well as its squared term, suggests that the level of 
communication a migrant has with their home country does have a positive, but 
diminishing, level of effect on remittances as a percentage of GDP.  With the introduction of 
this variable into the model the signs and significance levels of all other variables in the 
model remain unchanged.  Equally the joint significance of the variables of interest, the 
three beta coefficients (EFI, real GDP per capita and their interaction), is statistically 
significant at 1% level.  
                                                                    
12               
13 Prob > Chi2 = 0.0001 
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 Using the results from the final specification (column 4) we can then tell a level effect 
story. This should be viewed cautiously because it is difficult to define what a one unit 
increase in EFI means.  For example we can look at the Philippines in the year 2000. The 
country had EFI of 6.96 with a real GDP per capita of $3,965. A one unit increase in EFI 
would then result in an increase of remittances as a percentage of GDP by 0.18 percent (or 
$579,826,990).  This represents a 9.3% increase in remittances as a percentage of GDP.  A 
more informative analysis of the effect of EFI on workers’ remittances as a % of GDP 
conditional on the level of economic development within a country is obtained by a 
marginal effect graph (see Graph 1).  
                                                                    
14 Based on panel data between the period of 2000-2006 for 82 countries collected from the World Bank, 
World Penn Tables, The Frasier Institute and the IMF. There are 81 country-specific intercept dummy 
variables and five time –specific intercept dummy variables in the models whose estimates are not reported. 
Robust standard errors reported in parenthesis.  
Table 1: Dependent Variable = % of GDP from workers’ remittances  
(Estimated with Generalized Least Squares ,  country and t ime f ixed effects 14)  
Specif ications 
Independent Variables       (1) (2)     (3) (4) 
Economic Freedom  .00129 
( .00043)** 
.00140 
( .00038)*** 
.00355 
( .00067)*** 
.00217 
( .00066)*** 
Real GDP per capita (Year 2005 $US  
Ten th ousands ) 
-- - .00538 
( .00092)*** 
.00490 
( .00255)* 
.00179 
( .00214) 
Interact ion between real  GDP per 
capita  and Economic  Freedom  
-- --  - .00135 
( .00028)*** 
- .00097 
( .00024)*** 
Internet  users  per  100 people  -- --  --  .00020 
( .00003)*** 
Internet  users  squared  -- --  --  -2 .14e-06 
(2.52e-e07)*** 
Labor Force part icipation  rate  -- - .00026 
( .00009)** 
- .00024 
( .00008)** 
- .00035 
( .00010)*** 
% of  school aged chi ldren enrol led 
in secondary education  
-- .00005 
( .00003) 
.00010 
( .00003)** 
.00007 
( .00003)** 
Populat ion ( in Mill ions)  -- -1 .50e-07 
(4.18e-08)*** 
-1 .91e-07 
(-4.89e08)*** 
-1 .62e-07 
(4.23e-08)*** 
Constant  .06180 
( .00373)*** 
.07513 
( .00666)*** 
.05615 
( .00643)*** 
.07433 
( .00776)*** 
n=467                                                                                                             *=90%  **=95%  ***=99% lev els  of  confidence  
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      Figure 115 shows the effect of EFI on workers’ remittances as a percentage of GDP 
conditional upon the countries real GDP per capita. Graph 1 shows all countries that have a 
real GDP per capita below $20,000 the effect of an increase in EFI will have a positive effect 
on remittances as a percentage of GDP.  Equally for all countries that have a level of 
economic development greater than $20,000 real GDP per capita the effect of an increase in 
EFI will result in a negative effect on remittances as a percentage of GDP.  Becoming more 
economically free has a greater effect on workers’ remittances for developing countries 
than it does for countries that are economically developed (or further along the path of 
economic development).   
 The interaction of EFI and real GDP per capita allows for the comparison of countries of 
similar levels of economic development. In 2003 Venezuela and Mexico each had a real GDP 
per capita near $10,000. Venezuela had an EFI of 3.99 with .065% of GDP from remittances, 
where Mexico had an EFI of 6.27 with 1.69% of its GDP from remittances. It is then possible 
to determine that 21.3% of the difference in workers’ remittances between the two 
countries is explained by their difference in economic freedom16.   
  
                                                                    
15 For graphical purposes workers’ remittance as a percentage of GDP is divided by 10,000 for graph 1 and 
the five marginal effect graphs found in Appendix F.  
16 00217 - .0097 (1) = .0012 
    [(.0012)(6.27-3.99)] / (.0169 - .00065)  = 21.3%  
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Twenty-two countries within the sample had a real GDP per capita greater than 
$20,000 (for the last year sampled), while the remainder, sixty countries, had a real GDP 
per capita of less than $20,000. Those with a real GDP per capita of less than $20,000, on 
average, had economies that were much more reliant upon remittances. Countries that are 
still developing economically are much more reliant on remittances as a percentage of GDP 
than more economically developed countries. The average workers’ remittances as a 
percentage of GDP for countries with less than $20,000 real GDP per capita was 1.6 
percent, while the average workers’ remittances as a percentage of GDP for countries with 
more than $20,000 real GDP per capita was only .59 percent. 
  
Graph 1: 
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AREAS OF ECONOMIC FREEDOM  
 
The final specification (Table 1 column 4) can then be applied to each of the five areas 
of economic freedom (see Table 2). In each of the five models within table 2 the ith area of 
economic freedom represents that particular area of EFI, this is then interacted with real 
GDP per capita for a particular country at a particular time. Under each of the five models 
the area of economic freedom, real GDP per capita and the interaction of these two 
variables remain jointly significant at a once percent level.  
Marginal effect graphs similar to Graph 1 can then be drawn to illustrate the effect of an 
increase of economic freedom within each of the five areas of the EFI and their effect on 
workers’ remittances as a percentage of GDP conditional on the level of economic 
development17.  This allows further insight into the particular channels of economic 
freedom that have the greatest, or least, effect on workers’ remittances.   
  
                                                                    
17 See Appendix F for EFI Area 1-5 marginal effect graphs.  
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Areas 2, 3, and 5 of the EFI (legal structure and security of property rights, access to 
sound money and regulation of credit, labor and business, respectively) each have similar 
results as overall EFI.  In each of these three areas the effect of increasing economic 
freedom within the area has a positive effect on workers’ remittances as a percentage of 
GDP for countries with a real GDP per capita of $20,000 or less.  For developed nations, 
those with a real GDP per capita greater than $20,000, the effect of increasing economic 
freedom within each of these three areas has a negative effect on the amount of 
remittances, as a percentage of GDP, the country receives.  
                                                                    
18 Based on panel data between the period of 2000-2006 for 82 countries collected from the World Bank, 
World Penn Tables, The Frasier Institute and the IMF. There are 81 country-specific intercept dummy 
variables and five time –specific intercept dummy variables in the models whose estimates are not reported. 
Robust standard errors reported in parenthesis.  
Table 2: Dependent Variable = % of GDP from workers’ remittances  
(Estimated with Generalized Least Squares ,  country f ixed effects 18) 
   Models   
i t h  Ar ea of  Econ omic fr eed om   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  
 
The i t h  Area of  Economic  
Freedom 
- .00019  
( .00022) 
.000039 
( .00028) 
.00101 
( .00022)*** 
- .00026 
( .00029) 
.00203 
( .00033)*** 
Real  GDP per capita  (Year 2005 
$US thousands) 
- .00388 
(00120)*** 
- .00568 
( .00115)*** 
- .00213 
( .00200) 
- .00568 
( .00115)*** 
.00113 
( .00145) 
(Real GDP per  capita)  x  (  i t h  
area of  Economic  Freedom) 
- .00020 
( .00010) * 
- .00003 
( .00011) 
- .00038 
( .00200)* 
.00044 
( .00013)*** 
- .00080 
( .00016)*** 
Internet  users  per  100 people  .00020 
( .00004)*** 
.00019 
( .00003)*** 
.00018 
( .00003)*** 
.00016 
( .00003)*** 
.00016 
( .00003)*** 
Internet  users  squared  -2 .37e-06 
(2.59e-
07)*** 
-2 .28e-06 
(2.80e-07)*** 
-1 .97e-06 
(2.74e-07)*** 
-1 .98e-06 
(2.69e-07)*** 
-1 .94e-06 
(2.70e-07)*** 
Labor Force part icipation  rate  .00042 
( .00009)*** 
- .00039 
( .00010)*** 
- .00017 
( .00009) * 
- .00039 
( .00090)*** 
- .00048 
( .00010)*** 
% of  school  aged ch i ldren 
enrol led  in secondary  
education 
.00004 
( .00003) 
.00002 
( .00003) 
.00005 
( .00003) 
.00001 
( .00003) 
.00002 
( .00003) 
Populat ion ( in Mill ions)  -1 .67e-07 
(3.83e-
08)*** 
-1 .31e-07 
(4.17ee-08)** 
-1 .23e-07 
(3.26ee-08)*** 
-3 .26e-07 
(4.17ee-08)*** 
-1 .76e-07 
(3.89ee-08)*** 
Constant  .09713 
( .00695)*** 
.09288 
( .00725)*** 
.07103 
( .00641)*** 
.09688 
( .00708)*** 
.08874 
( .00811)*** 
J o i n t  S i g n i f i ca n ce  o f  i th  Ar e a  o f  
E F I ,  R e a l  G D P  pe r  C a p it a  a n d t he i r  
i n t e ra c t i o n  
P  >  C h i 2  =  
0 . 0 0 0  
P  >  C h i 2  =  0 . 0 0 0  P  >  C h i 2  =  0 . 0 0 0  P  >  C h i 2  =  0 . 0 0 0  P  >  C h i 2  =  0 . 0 0 0  
n=467                                                                                                              *=90%  **=95%  ***=99% lev els  of  c onfidence  
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The increase of economic freedom of Area 1, the size of government, is the one area that 
has a negative effect on workers’ remittances as a percentage of GDP for nearly all 
countries within the sample. Here the positive effect of decreasing the size of government 
(an increase in economic freedom) only has a positive effect for countries that have a real 
GDP per capita less than $1,000.  A decrease in the size of government results in negative 
effects on workers’ remittances as a percentage of GDP for all countries with a real GDP per 
capita over$1000.  In the sample for this study only 16 observations19 had a real GDP per 
capita of $1000 or less, with the remaining 449 observations having a level of economic 
development above $1000 real GDP per capita. 
An increase in the economic freedom of Area 4, the freedom to trade internationally, 
has a negative effect on countries with a real GDP per capita of less than $10,000 real GDP 
per capita, 54% of the sample.  The effect of increasing the freedom to trade internationally 
does not have a positive effect on workers’ remittances as a percentage of GDP until a 
country exceeds a real GDP per capita of $10,000.  This may be a reflection of international 
investors, in this case migrants who are unwilling to invest in a country (remit money) 
until there is a basic level of infrastructure within the country. This infrastructure, whether 
physical or financial, may not be present in countries that are at the lowest levels of 
economic development – those below $10,000 real GDP per capita levels.   
  
                                                                    
19 4 countries (Guinea-Bissau 2000; Madagascar 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006; Malawi 2001; 
Niger 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006; Togo 2000).  
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CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
 
This study provides evidence to suggest that an increase in Economic Freedom, in 
particular the legal structure and security of property rights, the access to sound money 
and the regulation of credit, labor and business, has a positive effect on workers’ 
remittances as a percentage of GDP for developing countries.  There is also evidence to 
suggest that decreasing the size of government has a negative effect on workers’ 
remittances for all but the most impoverished countries.  
Increasing a countries ability to trade internationally has a negative effect on workers’ 
remittances for countries at the lowest end of the economic development ladder; those 
below $10,000 real GDP per Capita. This marginal, negative, effect becomes smaller 
(absolute value) as countries approach an economic development level of $10,000 real GDP 
per capita. Remittances inflows increase as the freedom to trade internationally increases 
for countries exceeding the economic development level of $10,000 real GDP per capita. 
Developing countries are much more dependent upon remittances than countries with 
higher levels of economic development. For many developing countries workers’ 
remittances represent a significant financial inflow for their economy.  These same 
countries have lower levels of economic freedom than their developed counterparts. I show 
that increasing the level of economic freedom in developing countries will have a positive 
effect on the remittance inflows received within those countries. 
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 APPENDICES   
APPENDIX A: SUMMARY STATISTICS 
 
  
  
                                                                    
20 467 observations from 82 countries across 7 years (2000-2006). For a list of countries see Appendix B.  
21 See Appendix C for summary statistics on Economic Freedom Areas 1 - 5 
Variable Observations20 Mean Minimum Maximum 
Worker Remittances as a % of GDP 467 0.013 
(.175) 
.000 .096 
Economic Freedom21 467 6.69 
(.869) 
3.99 8.920 
Real GDP per Capita (Year 2005, US$) 467 14,960 
(13,611) 
658 74,366 
Cell Phone Use (per 100 people) 467 40.99 
(36.670) 
0 150.86 
Internet Use (per 100 people) 467 21.700 
(23.522) 
0.07 87.57 
Population (In thousands) 467 31,938 
(53,558) 
248 298,442 
Labor Force Participation Rate 467 62.356 
(8.700) 
47.4 87 
% School Enrollment (Secondary) 467 68.342 
(24.704) 
4.06 99.76 
Latin American 467 .208 0 1 
Africa 467 0.201 0 1 
Asia 467 0.112 0 1 
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APPENDIX B: COUNTRIES (AND OBSERVED YEARS) INCLUDED IN DATA SAMPLE 
                       
Asia (including Central and Southeast Asia)
AUSTRALIA (2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 
2006) 
BANGLADESH (2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 
2006) 
HONG KONG (2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006) 
INDONESIA (2000, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006) 
JAPAN(2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006) 
MALAYSIA(2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005) 
MONGOLIA(2004, 2005, 2006) 
NEW ZEALAND (2002) 
PAKISTAN (2001, 2002, 2004, 2005, 2006) 
PHILIPPINES (2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006) 
Latin America  
BELIZE (2000, 2002, 2004, 2005, 2006) 
BOLIVIA (2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2006) 
BRAZIL (2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005) 
COLOMBIA (2000, 2001, 2002, 2004, 2005, 2006) 
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC (2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 
2005, 2006) 
ECUADOR (2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006)  
EL SALVADOR (2000, 2002, 2003, 2005, 2006) 
GUATEMALA (2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 
2006) 
JAMAICA (2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005) 
MEXICO(2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006) 
NICARAGUA (2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 
2006) 
PANAMA (2000, 2001, 2002, 2004, 2005, 2006) 
PARAGUAY (2005, 2006) 
PERU (2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006) 
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO (2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 
2004, 2005) 
URUGUAY (2006)  
VENEZUELA (2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 
2006) 
Africa 
ALGERIA (2002, 2003, 2004) 
BENIN (2000, 2001) 
BOTSWANA (2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005) 
COTE D'IVOIRE (2000, 2001, 2002) 
EGYPT (2001, 2002) 
GHANA (2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006) 
GUINEA-BISSAU (2000) 
KENYA (2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006) 
MADAGASCAR (2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 
2006) 
MALAWI (2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006) 
MOROCCO (2000, 2002, 2003)  
MOZAMBIQUE (2004, 2005, 2006) 
NAMIBIA (2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 
2005, 2006) 
NIGER (2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006) 
NIGERIA(2003, 2004, 2005, 2006) 
SENEGAL(2004, 2005, 2006) 
SOUTH AFRICA (2000, 2005, 2006) 
SYRIA(2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006) 
TOGO (2000) 
TUNISIA  (2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2006) 
UGANDA (2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006) 
ZAMBIA (2004, 2005) 
Other 
ALBANIA (2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004) 
ARMENIA (2004, 2005, 2006) 
AZERBAIJAN (2005, 2006) 
BELGIUM (2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006) 
BULGARIA (2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006) 
CROATIA (2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2005, 2006) 
CYPRUS (2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006) 
DENMARK (2000, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006) 
ESTONIA (2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006) 
FIJI (2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006) 
FINLAND (2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006) 
FRANCE (2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006) 
GEORGIA (2005, 2006) 
GREECE (2000, 2001, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006) 
HUNGARY (2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006) 
ICELAND (2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006) 
IRELAND (2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006) 
ISRAEL (2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006) 
ITALY (2000, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006) 
JORDAN (2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006) 
LITHUANIA (2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 
2006) 
LUXEMBOURG (2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 
2006) 
MACEDONIA (2005) 
MALTA (2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005) 
NETHERLANDS (2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 
2006)  
NORWAY (2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005) 
OMAN (2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006) 
POLAND (2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006) 
PORTUGAL (2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2005, 2006) 
ROMANIA (2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006) 
SLOVENIA (2000, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006) 
SPAIN (2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006) 
SWEDEN (2000, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006) 
SWITZERLAND(2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 
2006) 
TURKEY (2005, 2006) 
UKRAINE (2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006) 
UNITED KINGDOM (2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 
2005, 2006) 
UNITED STATES (2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 
2006)
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APPENDIX C: AREAS OF ECONOMIC FREEDOM SUMMARY STATISTICS 
 
 
SIMPLE CORRELATION MATRIX OF THE AREAS OF ECONOMIC FREEDOM 
 
 Area 1 Area 2 Area3 Area 4 Area 5 
Area 1 1.0000     
Area 2 -0.4127 1.0000    
Area 3 -0.0433 0.5022 1.0000   
Area 4 -0.1303 0.5372 0.5337 1.0000  
Area 5 0.0272 0.6095 0.4506 0.4938 1.0000 
 
  
Variable Observations Mean Minimum Maximum 
Economic Freedom -  Area 1 
(Size of Government) 
467 6.17 
(1.50) 
2.56 9.32 
Economic Freedom -  Area 2 
(Legal Structure and Security of Property 
Rights) 
467 5.86 
(2.03) 
1.43 9.62 
Economic Freedom -  Area 3 
(Access to Sound Money) 
467 8.20 
(1.52) 
2.24 9.84 
Economic Freedom -  Area 4 
(Freedom to trade internationally) 
467 7.02 
(0.96) 
3.71 9.75 
Economic Freedom -  Area 5 
(Regulation of Credit, Labor, and Business) 
467 6.18 
(1.06) 
1.49 8.90 
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APPENDIX D: REGIONAL SUMMARY STATISTICS  
AFRICA 
 
  
                                                                    
22 21 African countries across 7 years (2000-2006). For a list of countries see Appendix B. 
23 See Appendix C for summary statistics on Economic Freedom Areas 1 - 5 
Variable Observations22 Mean Minimum Maximum 
Worker Remittances as a % of GDP 95 0.007 
(0.008) 
0.000 0.037 
Economic Freedom23 95 6.001 
(0.717) 
4.49 7.18 
Real GDP per Capita (Year 2005, US$) 95 3,079 
(2,561) 
658 9,979 
 
Cell Phone Use (per 100 people) 95 6.899 
(10.914) 
0 83.69 
Internet Use (per 100 people) 95 2.106 
(2.057) 
.110 7.91 
Population (In thousands) 95 23,608 
(27,204) 
1,279 140,398 
Labor Force Participation Rate 95 68.634 
(12.247) 
47.80 87 
% School Enrollment (Secondary) 95 34.450 
(20.074) 
4.06 71.63 
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ASIA 
 
  
                                                                    
24 10 Asian countries across 7 years (2000-2006). For a list of countries see Appendix B. 
25 See Appendix C for summary statistics on Economic Freedom Areas 1 - 5 
Variable Observations24 Mean Minimum Maximum 
Worker Remittances as a % of GDP 53 0.009 
(0.011) 
0.000 0.037 
Economic Freedom25 53 6.894 
(0.982) 
5.42 8.92 
Real GDP per Capita (Year 2005, US$) 53 15,877 
(12,739) 
1,792 40,593 
Cell Phone Use (per 100 people) 53 42.430 
(38.363) 
.200 137.73 
Internet Use (per 100 people) 53 27.409  
(25.237) 
.07 68.52 
Population (In thousands) 53 73,099 
(2,825) 
2,825 231,820 
Labor Force Participation Rate 53 63.977 
(5.310) 
51.1 72.6 
% School Enrollment (Secondary) 53 67.060 
(22.334) 
19.53 99.76 
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LATIN AMERICA 
 
  
                                                                    
26 17 Latin American countries across 7 years (2000-2006). For a list of countries see Appendix B. 
27 See Appendix C for summary statistics on Economic Freedom Areas 1 - 5 
Variable Observations26 Mean Minimum Maximum 
Worker Remittances as a % of GDP 98 0.023 
(.023) 
0.000 0.092 
Economic Freedom27 98 6.42 
(0.781) 
3.99 7.43 
Real GDP per Capita (Year 2005, US$) 98 7,528 
(3,623) 
2,008 21,403 
Cell Phone Use (per 100 people) 98 23.155 
(19.299) 
1.45 74.76 
Internet Use (per 100 people) 98 8.938 
(7.813) 
0.71 46.49 
Population (In thousands) 98 29,083 
(47,238) 
248 188,993 
Labor Force Participation Rate 98 63.721 
(3.474) 
56.6 71.50 
% School Enrollment (Secondary) 98 58.692 
(12.808) 
26.88 80.26 
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APPENDIX E: VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
 
Workers’ Remittances 
Workers' remittances and compensation of employees consists of current transfers by migrant workers as 
well as wages and salaries earned by nonresident workers. These data are the sum of three items defined in 
the fifth edition of the IMF's Balance of Payments Manual; workers' remittances, compensation of employees, 
and migrants' transfers. (The World Bank 2011). 
Economic Freedom  Index  
This is an averaged index across all “five” areas of economic freedom (described below).  
Economic Freedom Area 1 
Size of government. This consists of; government expenditures, taxes and enterprises - measured by 
government consumption spending as a percentage of total consumption, government enterprises, transfers 
and subsidies as a percentage of GDP and investment as a percentage of GDP and the top marginal tax rate 
including the income threshold to which it applies (Berggren 2003). 
Economic Freedom Area 2 
Legal structure and security of property rights. This consists of; judicial independence and impartial courts, 
lack of military interference in the political process and rule of law, protection of intellectual property rights 
and integrity within the legal system (Berggren 2003). 
Economic Freedom Area 3 
Access to sound money. This consists of; the recent inflation rate, the standard inflation variability in the past 
five years, average annual growth of the money supply for the previous five years minus the average annual 
growth of real GDP for the past ten years and the freedom of individuals to own foreign currency bank 
accounts either domestically or abroad (Berggren 2003). 
Economic Freedom Area 4 
Regulatory trade barriers. This consists of; hidden import barriers (barriers other than public tariffs and 
quotas), the cost to import goods, the difference between the official exchange rate and the black market 
exchange rate and international capital market controls (such as the availability of domestic citizens to obtain 
foreign capital or the availability of foreign citizens to obtain domestic capital and the presence of barriers 
that limit citizens to engage in exchange with foreigners) (Berggren 2003).  
Economic Freedom Area 5 
Regulation of credit, labor and business. This consists of; credit market regulations (ownership of banks, 
domestic banks competition with foreign banks, the percentage of credit extended to the private sector, 
avoidance of interest rate controls that may lead to real interest rates), labor market regulations (the impact 
of the minimum wage on wages, hiring and firing practices within the private sector, the share of labor force 
whose wages are determined through collective bargaining, unemployment benefits and their effect on the 
incentives to works) and business regulation (the ability of businesses to se their own prices, administrative 
procedures acting as an obstacle to new business generation, time spent by private sector management 
dealing with government bureaucracy, ease of starting a new business) (Berggren 2003).  
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School enrollment, secondary (% of secondary school age children)  
“Net enrollment ratio is the ratio of children of official school age based on the International Standard 
Classification of Education 1997 who are enrolled in school to the population of the corresponding official 
school age. Secondary education completes the provision of basic education that began at the primary level, 
and aims at laying the foundations for lifelong learning and human development, by offering more subject- or 
skill-oriented instruction using more specialized teachers.  
Source: United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Institute for Statistics” 
(The World Bank 2011). 
Fixed broadband Internet subscribers (per 100 people)  
“Fixed broadband Internet subscribers are the number of broadband subscribers with a digital subscriber 
line, cable modem, or other high-speed technology.  
Source:  International Telecommunication Union, World Telecommunication/ICT Development Report and 
database, and World Bank estimates” (The World Bank 2011). 
Labor participation rate, total (% of total population ages 15+)  
“Labor force participation rate is the proportion of the population ages 15 and older that is economically 
active: all people who supply labor for the production of goods and services during a specified period. 
Source: International Labour Organization, Key Indicators of the Labour Market database” (The World Bank 
2011). 
Population (in thousands) 
Population is from the World Bank World Development Indicators 2009, and United Nations Development 
Centre sources prior to 1960 (Heston, Summers and Aten 2009) 
 
Real Gross Domestic Product per Capita, current price 
Real Gross Domestic product per capita, current price, is obtained by adding up consumption, investment, 
government and exports, and subtracting imports in any given year. The given year components are obtained 
by extrapolating the 2005 values in international dollars from the Geary aggregation using national growth 
rates” (Heston, Summers and Aten 2009) 
 
Real GDP per capita (Constant Price) 
RGDPL is obtained by adding up consumption, investment, government and exports, and 
subtracting imports in any given year. The given year components are obtained by extrapolating the 
2005 values in international dollars from the Geary aggregation using national growth rates. (Heston, 
Summers and Aten 2009) 
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APPENDIX F: INDIVIDUAL EFI AREA MARGINAL EFFECT GRAPHS 
AREA 1: SIZE OF GOVERNMENT 
 
AREA 2: LEGAL STRUCTURE AND SECURITY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 
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AREA 3: ACCESS TO SOUND MONEY 
 
AREA 4: FREEDOM TO TRADE INTERNATIONALLY 
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AREA 5: REGULATION OF CREDIT, LABOR AND BUSINESS 
 
 
 
